THE CULTURE OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE (THE OSH CONFLICT)

Preamble

     Ethnic conflicts and violence in ex-communist World has caused a rich literature describing and debating this phenomena from different political and methodological perspectives. The results of these efforts are quite disheartening mainly because of narrow visions imposed by the Cold War warriors' mentality and by legacies of deterministic paradigm. Positivistic approach combined with ideological engagements is dominating in academic communities behind both sides of the former "iron curtain". It produces simplistic explanations for what had happened with the former Soviet Union and what are the prospects for ethnic manifestations in this area of the World. As an example, we give one of these conclusions: "As the liberation and democratization of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union continue, the needs for identity, recognition, autonomy, dignity, bonding, and security of those pursuing change will intensify, exacerbating ongoing or creating new conflicts with others who, given their own role defense, will want to maintain the current, or re-establish an earlier, status-quo"(Sandole, 1992:16).

     This vision reflects not only explicit political motives but also a formula of the most dominant conception in ethnic conflict's interpretations - that is so-called "human needs theory". It is based on postulates about existing among members of racial, religious and ethnic groups of deep-rooted alienation and hostility towards "others" or "outgroups" which have usually long history and sporadically erupts into opened violence. The source of these hostility and violence is an absence or a rejection of a group,s "developmental requirements" which comprise absolutely essential needs (Lederer, 1980; Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990). Partly, this approach originates from the "frustration-aggression theory" (Dollard et el., 1939) and its later modifications when frustration and violence are associated with rejection in a "hierarchy of needs" of "substantive" ones comparing to "implementary needs"(Davies, 1973, 1986). In this situation "violence...is produced when certain innate needs or demands are deeply frustrated"(Davies, 1973:251).  Partly, it is possible to trace an influence of human rights and peace and security studies which were flourishing since 1960-ths and especially of a thesis on "structural violence"(Galtung,1969).

     One of the proponents of this approach, John Burton defines these basic needs among others as for identity and for security: "Human needs theory argues... that there are certain ontological and genetic needs that will be pursued, and that socialization process, if not compatible with such human needs, far from socializing, will lead to frustrations, and to disturbed and anti-social personal and group behaviors. Individuals cannot be socialized into behaviors that destroy their identity and other need goals and, therefore, must react against environments that do this."(Burton, 1990:33-34). Denying group basic needs causes a "fear of group extinction" and this fear reflecting some kind of "biological element" make ethnic and cultural conflicts a constant and unavoidable component of socio-political systems. "No matter what barriers they may encounter, people will aspire to meet their needs, one way or another, even to the extent that they may be defined by others as "deviant" even as "criminal"(e.g. terrorist)"(Sandole,1992:13).

     For those who ascribe primordialistic interpretations of ethnicity it is a first and natural step to diagnose groups valnurable to or disposed at violence. That is how a list of "minorities at risk" numbered 233 was elaborated in one of influential recent study. "These are groups whose members either have experienced systematic discrimination or have taken political action to assert their collective interests against the states that claim to govern them"(Gurr, 1993:315).

     Studing cases of ethnic conflicts and violence on the territory of the former Soviet Union we had discovered certain incompatibilities between described interpretations and our own observations. At least few questions arise which do not fit ontological model. First, ethnic groups are not so coherent to display irresistible strife for keeping their identity: most of these identities were constructed during the Soviet period and have very fluid boundaries and multiplied identities, exactly as it was pointed by Frederick Barth and elaborated by many researches in different countries (Barth, 1969; Anderson, 1983; Handler, 1988; Tishkov, 1992). Second, not most diminished and deprived of "basic needs" groups formulate claims to change a status-quo and initiate conflicts and violence in cosidered area. More often, groups (to be precise - their elite elements) with titular status and well-established cultural institutions initiated intolerance and suppression towards "others" (Uzbeks toward Meskhetian Turks, Kirgiz toward Uzbeks, Azeris toward Armenians, Moldovians toward Gagauz and Russians, Georgians toward Abkhazians and Ossetians, Ossetians toward Ingush, etc.). Third, field studies and other data on conflicting ethnicity do not prove a thesis about deep-rooted and protracted interethnic hatred and alienation: even in Nagorno-Karabakh region Armenian-Azerbaidjanis intergroup relations were characterized by high level of tolerance and cooperation, as well as for Georgian-Abkhazian and for other situations where opened violence erupted (Yamskov, 1991; Arutunyan and Bromley, 1989). Fourth, it is quite dangerous to accept a thesis on the legitimacy of "violence because of group needs" which practically excludes from the analyses individual interests and motivations for exercising deviant or criminal behaviour. It is trivial but any group violence is a sum of individual violent acts which are in most cases  out of law and order. There are another reservations about prevailing interpretations could be mentioned and that stimulated us to undertake the following analysis of one of the most demonstrative case in the post-Soviet space.

      Osh ethnic conflict of summer 1990 was one of large‑scaled and   violent  on  the  territory  of  the  former USSR,  involving representatives of two Central Asian ethnic  groups  ‑  Uzbeks  and Kyrghyz,  belonging  so‑called  titular nationalities of the former Soviet Union.  The conflict which  we  categorize  as  a  riot‑type conflict(1),  broke  out  in  administrative  Osh oblast of Kyrghyz republic which in its western part borders with Fergana  oblast  of Uzbekistan.   Osh   oblast   is   characterized  by  a  multiethnic population:  of 1,3 million ethnic  Kyrghyz  comprise  60%,  Uzbeks number  26%  and  Russians  estimate 6%  with many smaller minority groups(Tadjiks,  Tatars,  Ukranians,  Volga Germans, Uigurs, Turks, Azeris  and  others).  Patterns  of  settlement  of the main groups reflect differences in traditional economic orientation of  Kyrghyz and Uzbeks that had existed earlier times:  the former dwell mostly in the mountains and the foothills,  the latter reside  in  plains. Concentration  of  Uzbeks and Russians in the cities is higher than that of Kyrghyz;  Uzbeks  number  46%,  Kyrghyz  24%  and  Russians comprise  about  20%  in  the  administrative  centre  of  Osh (211 thousand people). Uzbeks are also a majority in the regional centre ‑ a city of Uzgen: among 34167 citizens 27525 Uzbeks, 4244 Kyrghyz, 1440  Russians   and   Ukranians.   Rural   population   of   Uzgen administrative  region  (117639  people)  consists  of  7649 (6.5%) Uzbeks,  102184  (86.9%)  Kyrghyz,   3080   (2.6%)   Russians   and Ukrainians(2). Industry is  quite  well developed in Osh oblast:  all oil and almost all gas extraction (95%) of Kyrghyzstan is carried out here, metallurgical,  machine‑building, construction industry enterprises are located in this area.  Osh oblast accounts for about 1/3 of all industrial  production  of  the  republic.  Rapidly  growing  urban centres are surrounded by fertile  lands  on  which  cotton,  rice, tobacco,  wheat,  fruits and mulberry silkworm are cultivated.  Osh oblast is the only place in Kyrghyzstan where cotton is  grown  and silk is produced,  this oblast produces 85% of walnut yield in CIS. Russians occupy leading positions in industry ,  whereas Uzbeks are mainly  engaged in agriculture.  Kyrghyz dominate in cattlebreeding (horse‑ and sheepbreeding,  as well a breeding goats to make  down, the latter is practically unknown to the rest of Kyrghyzstan).  Under conditions  of  low  living standards,  socio‑economic crisis  and  political  destabilization  interethnic  tension   has emerged  due to a number of causes,  among which the most important were increasing intergroup competition over resources (land  lots), struggle   to   gain   control   over   power   structures,  social differentiation  along  the  line  "the  city   ‑   the   village", unemployment  and  lack  of  housing.  Some  experts  believe  the incompetence of the oblast administration as well as the activities of non‑governmental organizations and nationalist groups both among the Kyrghyz and the Uzbeks were  a  significant  factor  in  fermenting ethnic unrest and violence (Elebayeva, 1991).

    Open conflict  in  the  form  of  mass riots and intercommunal clashes broke out on June 4,  1990 in the city of  Osh  and  spread over Uzgen and other regions the next day.  In addition to the city of Uzgen mass unrest took place in a number of surrounding  Kyrghyz villages,  where participants of the conflict had committed violent acts against the Uzbeks  and  made  attempts  to  get  to  Uzgen  under pretension  to  defend  the Kyrghyz,  make short work of the Uzbeks and drive them out of the city. According to certain data the conflict was related to economic "mafia's"  activities  and  the  situation  in the high‑ranking power structures of the  republic.  Namely,  as  a  result  of  political changes  brought about by perestroika,  in Kyrghyzstan a balance in the  distribution  of  higher‑ranking  and  prestigious   positions between  the  leading  regional  clans  (that  had been observed by decades and to some extent reflected former tribal distinctions and culturally specific groups among the Kyrghyz) was violated.  Former First Secretary of Kyrghyz Communist party Masanov underscored this aspect  in  his  conversation with the author:  "In the past we had tried to watch how our three  major  groups divide  high  positions between  themselves.  These  new  leaders  started  to  forget about it"(3). The outcomes  of  the  conflict were devastating: during a week of June 4‑10th 120 Uzbeks,  50 Kyrghyz and one Russian were killed. According the  report of the investigatory bodies more than 5000 crimes were committed (murders,  rapes,  pogroms and burglaries).  Violence was stopped by imposing the state of emergency and by sending army troops in a zone of the conflict.

Methodology, sources and methods of research

    The studies of events in Osh were carried out by a number of   specialists, mainly   ethnosociologists   (Asankanov,  1991; Elebayeva,  1991;  Brusina,  1990 et al.) However, anthropological approaches  have  not  been applied so far and analysis of the very nature of  ethnic  violence  has  not  been  properly  done.  While conceptualizing   the   conflict,   not   only  that  in  Osh,  the instrumentalist approach within the framework of dominating Marxist   positivist   tradition  prevails  in  post‑Soviet  social sciences.  The essence of this research practice is  in  revealing "regularities",  identifying  objective factors,  mainly of those of social origin,  that cause this or that social phenomena, including social  anomalies  as conflict and violence.  Accurate description, i.e.  the one that "captures  the  gist"  and  explanation  of  the subject  are  equalled  to  science.  The  conflict  itself  becomes indistinguishable from its descriptions and the variety of opinions in these narratives are explained in the first place by whether the approach is "correct" or "incorrect" or whether  the  opinion  that had  been  put  forward was "true" or "not true".  Therefore,  "the rule" and "the faith" set up by the unknown or personally  declared specialists become the main coordinates in assessing the efforts of the  researchers  and  the  ground  for  identifying   the   "true" viewpoint.  For  all  above‑mentioned authors Osh conflict presents their own point of view which is not subject to any doubts. 

     Within the framework of this tradition ethnic  conflict  looks like  some  kind  of  a  social  monolith which has appeared fairly recently in the societal practice but  must  necessarily  have  its case story and internal model.  In fact, the mosaics of opinions on the subject that is being mystically preserved reflects differences in  the approaches of disciplines,  personal political engagements, and,  most important,  the complexity of the object  itself,  which contains  the  explanatory  activity  of  the  "special sets' as its component.  In order not to bring about more claims  to  accomplish "cognition"  we  have  favoured  a  method of obediently following a rather accidentally chosen source,  while the latter is not even  a source  but  a  textualized  version of events in the form of court sentences,  thus thematizing our own  narration  as  the  study  of ethnic violence (EV).

      What is  an  ethnic violence in the research field of conflict interaction ‑  this  matter does  not  fit  for   another  rigid definition. The situation may vary from coutry to country and because of this and because of scholarly tradition there may be different labels and definitions for the violent phenomenon. As it is pointed in one of the most recent studies on the subject, "we have as editors chosen the label racist violence, defined as any violence in which victims are selected because of their ethnic, "racial", religious, cultural or national origin. The victims are attacked not in their capacities as individuals, but as representatives of such groups which are normally minorities in terms of numbers as well as in terms of power" (Bjorgo and Witte, 1993:6).

     We  consider EV as a subculture of violence in general with its own subjectivity and axiology,  i.e.  the system of values (or rather,  anti‑values) and evaluations. It is a form of violence which is carried out by a group or on behalf of the  group  against representatives  of an "alien" group (or groups),  i.e.  outsiders. Due to the fact that ethnic violence in the context  of  intergroup conflict  is  executed  as  the  form  of illegitimate violence (in contrast to violence  on  the  part  of  the  state  power),  as  a counter‑power  of  the  representatives  of social periphery of its kind  (i.e.  those  beyond  the  official  power)  against  "alien" marginals,  ethnic minorities or non‑status groups in this case. In such conceptualization EV acts as violence  of  "social  marginals" against  "ethnic"  or "racial" marginals.  Ethnic conflict being an intergroup interaction would have EV as one of  its  components  or "levels",  which  gravitates  towards intermediate type of conflicting situations (group aggression against the individual). "Performer" (a group  committing violence) and "victim" have asymmetrical roles in EV,  whereas in ethnic non‑violent conflict subjects and objects of fighting may  change places not once or act in both of these roles at the same time. In this connection studying ethnic violence as opposed to mass group conflicts is more fruitful in the genre of micro‑analysis  or micro-approach.  This  is a "local" context of the conflict behavior of its kind in contrast to "global" sociological analyses. While in all   previous   studies   Osh   conflict   was   thematized  in  a macro‑approach as the conflict of the two peoples, for us it presents  a  series of specific "local" episodes of EV,  in which locally dominating group executed violence against representatives  of  the local minority group. 

    So far Osh conflict has remained the only one in the territory of the former Soviet  Union  that  was  followed  by  court investigations;  a number of active participants of the unrest were identified  and  sentences  were  passed  to  individuals  who  had committed  crimes.  About  50 cases were investigated and 40 Kyrghyz and 10  Uzbeks  were  convicted.  This  became  possible  owing  to the President Akayev  stand  as  well   the   efficiency   of  the law‑enforcemement bodies of Kyrghyzstan,  though at the  moment  of the conflict itself these bodies had been paralysed. 

    To conduct  this  research  we  used  data  of 10 closed court trials that took place in 1991 at the panel of judges  on  criminal cases  of  the  Supreme  Court of Kyrghyzstan republic and the Osh City Court. 48 participants of the conflict were involved in the trial: 46  were  sentenced  and 2 were proved innocent.  The courts passed sentences  with  various  measures  of  punishment   ranging   from suspended sentence up to 18 years of maximum security prison. Texts of sentences appear to contain rather routine data that is  written in   a   standard  language  of  a  court  document  with  numerous repetitions and attributes necessary for such  texts.  Certainly  the materials  of  the investigation itself,  especially testimonies of the defendants and the witnesses,  present more rich  information, but  this  huge  amount  of  data  (more  than 300 volumes) was not available for us,  first of all due to the  secrecy  of  the  court cases.  However,  the data we had access to,  deserves attention of socio‑cultural anthropologist.

     At this initial stage of studying the  nature  of  EV  we  have limited ourselves with almost exclusive analysis of the text which undoubtedly carries the imprint of the dramatic character  of  the court  investigation  itself,  mentality  and  orientations of the court and prosecutors representatives, as well as the professional level  and  the  legal  culture  of the society in general.  Since almost   all   defendants   were   ethnic   Kyrghyz,   i.e.    the representatives  of the titular nationality,  the very fact of the court under conditions of ethnically divided  society,  high  group solidarity  and  low  civic and legal culture could testify to two phenomena: well‑thought camouflage with the courtesy to justice or a  true  breakthrough  towards creating civic society with emerging estrangement of ethnic nationalism. It seems more possible that we are dealing with the second version in this case. 

     The composition of the court did not follow Los‑Angeles model: the chairpersons or the judges and almost  all  lawyers  were  also Kyrghyz,   whereas  Russians  and  Ukrainans  prevailed  among  the people's representatives(4).  Sessions were held  in  Russian  with translation into Kirgiz language provided.  Texts of sentences that we analyzed were written in Russian.

Space and time of violence 

     Participants of "peripheral" events (which took place  in  the Uzgen region villages Kyzyl‑Oktyabr, Mirza‑Aki, Dzhylandy, Boru and their outskirts) only were  subject  to  the  court  investigation, which  we  consider.  As  compared  to  cities  of Osh and Uzgen no large‑scale clashes occurred here,  though the nature  and  form  of interethnic  conflict were similar.  In the village of Mirza‑Aki 19 people were assaulted on June 5,6 and 7,  ten women were raped  and 118 houses were destroyed with property embezzled. 

     These villages   in  the  outlying  districts  of  Uzgen  have predominantly Kirghiz population.  Uzbeks are the minority: 5.4% in Mirza‑Aki,  2% in Kyzyl Oktyabr, 3‑4% in Dzhylandy. These are quite large settlements that are  engaged  in  cultivation  of  rice  and cattle breeding , which number from 3‑5 to 12 thousand people, like in  Mirza‑Aki.  Their  infrastructures  are  poorly  developed,  it includes public clubs,  schools,  first‑aid stations,  tea‑drinking canteens and village councils.  Villages are  connected  by  roads, there  is also a system of irrigation ditches and water reservoirs. Apiaries and premises for cattle are located outside the  villages. This is a flat‑mountainous territory with fine viewing and sparse shelters. Landscape may play a certain role  in  the  evolution  of  the conflict  and  the  configuration  of  a concrete situation.  As it becomes obvious from the evidence given,  the victims  of  violence had  practically  no  opportunity to hide from the attackers making use of such natural shelters as,  for example,  forest or  canyons. The  victims hid in reeds,  wheat and mulberry trees that grow along the roads, but only distant mountains could be used as a more solid shelter.  It  is  known that the city of Uzgen was blocked by rural Kyrghyz and "self‑defense posts" did not let in the Uzbeks  that  fled the  surrounding  territory.  One  of  the victims (Baratbayev) who managed to escape the  battery,  was  fired  at  and  got  severely wounded precisely at this line (Case No.1‑30). 

     A lack   of  natural  barriers,  especially  in  the  form  of waterways  and  mountain  ranges,  contributed  to  spreading  and sustaining mass confrontations of the people.  It is the geography of Central Asian densely populated oases with surrounding  sparsely inhabited  territory  that  presents  space for human contacts when people could hardly be  brought  apart.  Spacial  view  of  unwooded plains  and  foothills increase capability of visual communication. In a whole number of cases it was exactly "what was seen  from  the distance"  ("a  group  of  guys  at  the water reservoir",  "Uzbeks working the in the field",  "a crowd in the  end  of  the  street", etc.)  that  allowed for and fostered complicity in or execution of violent acts. 

     Apparently, densely populated flat territory  without  natural barriers  and  shelters  facilitate immediate and mass outbursts of intercommunal violence to a much greater  extent  than  mountainous and  forest  areas.  However,  it  is  also  precisely this type of landscape that does not allow to sustain the ethnic foes in a stage of  an  open  conflict for a long time structuring positions around geographical landmarks and organizing a front‑line.  When  compared to  conflicts  in  other  regions  of  the former USSR,  mountains, rivers,  sea shore prevented many mass clashes on the one hand  and contributed   to  the   duration  of  the  confrontation  and  its transformation into protracted civil wars.  That was  the  case  in Georgia, Armenia, Tajikistan and Moldavian TransDniestria. In other words,  in a desolated plain oasises the outburst of mass  violence is  more  likely  than  in the mountainous gorge,  but it is in the mountains where it is more difficult to liquidate the conflict. To confirm this point we have analyzed the geography of mass EV zones  in  other  countries.  In  India,  South africa,  Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia explosive clashes of pogrom character  as  a  rule  took place  in  the  urban  space  or  in  flat  rural territory,  while protracted conflicts  modeled  after  civil  wars  were  formed  in mountainous regions.  Social geography of EV , including comparison with neighbouring territories and settled places plays  a  decisive role   in   characterizing   the  site  of  EV.  Why  violence  and intercommunal conflict under the situation of crisis or prior to it spring  up  in  one  place  and  do  not  appear  in the other one? Prosopography  (or  collective   portrait)   of   resident   places surrounding the cities of Osh and Uzgen may clarify quite a lot, in particular as what  concerns  the  state  of  social  institutions, cultural characteristics and the living conditions. 

     What do the texts of sentences tell with respect to the social content of EV  space?  Local  toponymies  being  a  mix  of  Soviet ideological  and  semi‑official  and  traditional  Kyrghyz names is quite characteristic in itself.  Crimes investigated at  the  court were  committed  in  the  villages  of  Kyzyl‑Oktyabr(Red October), Krasny  Mayak  (Red  Lighthouse),  Kirova  (name  of  the  Bolshevik leader), Mirza‑Aki, Komsomol etc. Criminal actions were occurring in the streets,  almost all of which have names that carry ideological content  that  meant  nothing  to  local  residents.  For instance, defendant K.A.Tashbayev,  convicted with murder,  rapes and pogroms in  the  village  of  Mirza‑Aki lived on Lenina street,  39 and his sister Mzamire lived on Sovetskaya street,  whereas he  and  others committed  porgoms  on  Moskovskaya and Kirova streets.  It is clear that such toponymy fails to serve as any  kind  of  social‑cultural restrictions or orientations. 

     Social space   of   Kyrghyz  villages  appears  to  be  poorly organized.  Just in one case was the central square mentioned,  the one  on which residents got together on June 5 as to learn what was going on in neighbouring  Uzgen  and  make  arrangements  on  joint actions.  In  other  cases  buildings  of the department store or a club,  garage store,  premises of the rural soviet (council) or the street  space  usually  closer  to the main road served as sites of meetings where the collective actions were to originate.  Not in a single  case did preparation or discussion of supposed actions took place in a cabinet situation or in any premises as such. The street and  outdoors  at large were the main space components for plotting and preparing for violent acts. 

     The participants of violent  actions  preferred  two  forms  of moving   in   this   space,  what  also  reflects  the  mixture  of modernization with traditionalism.  In the majority  of  cases  the groups were organized around a truck or a car which had been stolen or taken.  The truck provided faster movement  both  in  search  of future  victims  and  their transportation to more convenient place where reprisals were to take place.  This became especially  common when Uzbek women were taken to be raped. 

     The usage  of prestigious car was a sign of a more high status among the participants of unrest and fostered delegation of certain power and instructions for actions.  One of the sentences gives the following detail:"Further he explains that when they were beaten  a Volga car (most expensive domestic made vehicle used by officials ‑ VT) and a truck came by.  A guy with red band got out  of  the  car saying:"That's  enough,  guys,  finish  up  with  them,  save  your people".  The car and the truck took off. They were continued to be beaten" (Case No.1‑30, p.11).

     Individual cars   were   practically   not   used   since  the participants of crimes ‑ Kyrghyz  youth  ‑  do  not  have  them  as opposed  to  the Transcaucasus region where quite many young people would have their own cars that are  actively  used,  at  times  for criminal purposes and group conflict situations. Interestingly, the documents do not mention motorcycles ‑ this  most  common  mean  of transportation among Soviet rural youth. 

           Horseback riding is widely used in Kyrghyz cultural tradition as well as in some professional activities  in  rural  Kyrghyzstan. Kyrghyz  are believed to be skilled riders,  many valuers and merits of men are connected with the horse,  and this  cultural  component distinguishes  them from Uzbeks that had been traditionally engaged in land cultivation and commerce.It was precisely  the  horse  that had  been  used  for  committing most brutal murders of Uzbeks that were involved in agricultural works in remote and secluded  places. Four  young  Kyrghyz  shepherds  rode  horses to the foothill place Bak‑Archa as to finish off the family of the  bee‑keeper  Umurzakov who  had  set  up his private apiary in spring 1990 approximately 3 kilometres of  Kyjazov's  koshara,  the  latter  was  one  of  the murderers.  Text  of  the  sentence  mentions  an  episode when the herdsmen team‑leader  of  sovkhoz  "Papan"(collective  state  farm) visited  the  apiary  in the end of May and suggested to remove the apiary arguing that "the bees may beat  horses"  (Sentence  of  the Supreme Court of August 25, 1991).

     Four assassinators  riding  horses  drove  three Uzbek teenagers tied with a rope to the top of "Tosmo" mountain (their  father  was not  at  the  apiary  then)  and threw them down the abyss from the height of about 100 meters.  The sentence provides a  narration  of what happened (orthography was not changed):"By that time defendant Kalymov brought the rest of the horses and,  as defendant  Kalmatov had testified, defendant Matiyev took a rope from the saddle of his horse,  tied the hands of the Uzbeks  with  a  cross  knot  and  by Kalmatov's  suggestion took the another end of the rope and mounted a horse.  He was the first to take off for the mountain  along  the pass  to "Tosmo" top which was approximately in 800 meters distance from the apiary site.  Children followed Matiev in single line tied to  a  rope,  they were barefoot since it was only afterwards that only one shoe was found on  Alimov  Khalim's  foot.  Children  were followed by Kalmatov, Lyjazov and Kalykov riding horses, they urged the children on the way, apparently changed places". 

     By Kalykov's  story  Kalmatov  drove  on  the  children   with kamchma(a  whip)  ‑  the  way  it  is usually done with sheep.  By Kalmatov's story it was Kalykov and Matiyev  who  mostly  assaulted the  children  when  the  latter  were  climbing  up  the mountain. Defendant  Kyjazov  testified  that  when  going  up  the  mountain Kalmatov  beat  the children with kamchma when they were falling on the ground.  At the same interrogation he gave evidence that it was him  who  proposed  to gain revenge for the Kyrghyz and that he and Kalmatov took a rifle from Saipov to "chase Uzbeks" (Sentence  of the Supreme Court of August 26, 1991, p.4). Hence, for young Kyrghyz males the horse has somewhat become a symbol and a  real  means  to realize their superiority over members of another ethnic group, for it allowed to chase Uzbeks "as rams". 

     Two more Kyrghyz ‑ Bakiyev and Numratov ‑riding horses went to finish off Uzbeks on July 7.  They found a tent of the Uzbek family in the rice fields where Uzbek‑tenants had been working, killed its owner Saliyev and raped his wife (Supreme Court Sentence of January 11,  1991).  Three teenagers  under  legal  age  whom  Bakiyev  and Numratov got involved into raping Saliyeva rode horses to the tent. 

     As it  is  known from the general context of the conflict mass replacements and quick visits of Kyrghyz riders  to  the  sites  of Uzbek  residence  were  one  of  the  most  common forms of Kyrghyz participation in ethnic violence.  Riding horses Kyrghyz mobs  from the  outlying territories made attempts to breakthrough to the city of Uzgen,  but were stopped by  the  opposing  side  and  later  by law‑enforcement bodies and troops. From the point of view of the time factor mass ethnic violence gravitates  towards  explosive  and   transitory   forms   of   its manifestation if it does not evolve into organized military actions with establishing the  front‑line  and  semi‑military  or  military units  on  the  part  of the participants of the conflict.  In each specific site the duration of mass pogroms and  violence  is  as  a rule  limited by a two or three days term and it rarely goes on for a week or longer. Such situation could be traced in recent examples of  large‑scale  intercommunal  clashes  in  South  Africa,  India, Angola,  Germany and  in  examples  of  interracial  and  religious unrest in large Western cities (Los‑Angeles,  Belfast and others). Pogroms of Armenians in Sumgait (Azerbaijan),  Meskhetian Turks  in Fergana  valley  (Uzbekistan) and some other cases in the territory of the former Soviet Union that took place in the  last  few  years are characterized by more or less similar time span.  A number  of  factors  determines time parameters of mass EV. First of all,  and it deems to be of utmost importance,  the actors of  the  violence  find themselves in the state of social psychosis and extreme aggressiveness with complete involvement  into  actions that  they  commit  (usually  without  sleep  and  under  effect of alcohol and drugs) and perform their aggressiveness during one  or two  days.  Not  a single mass action of the defendants went on for more than two days and one night.  After that a  state  of  anxiety about  committed  crimes  develops  as well as the fear of possible revenge;  family members and other  pacifying  factors  have  their influence as well.  Participants often leave the place of permanent residence,  undertake actions as to hidden evidences the crime they had  committed or organize an alibi.  For instance, above‑mentioned Bakiyev and Nurmatov came by the foothill of the  rock  and  buried the corpses the next day after murdering the teenagers. Secondly, the purpose of violent actions in the course of mass interethnic clashes is not  immediately  related  to  realization  of long‑term projects and strategies,  it fits a simplified formula "to punish",  "to take revenge" and so on. This purpose is accomplished in a rather short term, which consists of the time needed to search for  the  victim  and  the  time  to  exercise  the  violent   act. Practically all participants of the cases considered here were busy looking for victims,  Uzbeks in this case.  At times it was limited by  a  moment  of  accidental encounter ("Tutashev and unidentified person of Kyrghyz  nationality  having  noticed  A.Siradzhinov,  an ethnic Uzbek, who was passing by, with the purpose of finishing him off..." (Case No. 1‑29).  Sometimes the search may take more  time ("Oh,  bastards,we  have been looking for you for so long!" ‑ cried Usenov to Uzbek girls whom he found at a tea‑place;  the girls came from  Uzgen  to  work  in  the  fields).  According to testimony of plaintiff Dzhorobayeva,  Usenov told her when she was taken out  of the room:  "I have been looking for you during three hours already" (Case No.1‑57). The duration of exercising the violence itself depends upon the type  of  actions.  Pogroms  of  houses  and  plundering  property, batteries,  including that  completed  with  murder,  usually  took several  hours in Uzgen region.  Rapes,  accompanied by moving from one place to other for a number of times and  a  peculiar  form  of imprisonment  sometimes lasted for more than 24 hours.  Ten Kyrghyz youngsters sentenced for raping two Uzbek girls drove the latter in the  truck during all night:  from the tea‑place to koshara(a place for cattle),  then to water reservoir and finally to village Yukos, where they left their victims. 

     Finally, the   duration  of  mass  unrest  on  the  ground  of interethnic hostility is limited by the forces  of  social  control and public order, bodies of state power in the first place. In this case Uzbek‑Kyrghyz clashes were to a large  extent  halted  by  the armed forces.  Local law‑enforcement bodies were paralysed and even partly involved into ongoing events or became estranged because  of ethnic belonging of the employees. The time  that  is  needed  for sluggish state structures with vertical hierarchy to elaborate necessary response  and  carry  out practical  actions  on  bringing  apart  the conflicting sides most often determines the moment  of  completing  mass  EV.  These  slow actions  are  often interpreted by the participants of the conflict as intentioned encouragement of violence,  as a sanction to  commit criminal  acts  against  co‑citizens  of another ethnic background. However data on the conflict in Osh,  the same as  on  the  similar events, do not provide with enough confirmation on the presence and realization of such a plot.  But it would  still  be  a  mistake  to exclude this version. 

Performers of ethnic violence

    We wanted to avoid the temptation to pay tribute to prosopography  method  and  draw  a  collective  portrait   of   EV performers.  However certain generalized characteristics may be useful for deconstructing the described  social  action. Among  48  defendants  involved in the ten cases there was only one female ‑ retired Toktakan Kakieva,  resident of Mirza‑Aki  village, sentenced for 8 years of prison for active complicity in collective battery of two Uzbeks (when one of them was killed) in the form  of instigating and organizing violent acts. 

     With respect to that victim Baratbayev witnessed at the court: "At this time he saw four women  standing  beside  him  among  whom there was defendant Kakieva.  She was standing in 5 meters distance from him and shouted together with  U.Kamchibekova:"Kill  them,  or else  they  will  get  here in the evening and kill us".  Then they began beating them up again and he fell in the  canal.  After  that Nazarov and Ermekbayev seized him, dragged him out of the canal and held him while the others, including teenagers started beating him. Women  did  not beat him,  but they cried,  demanding to kill them" (Case No.1‑30, p.10‑11). 

     Our data  demonstrates  that  women  did  not  take  part   in executing violent acts directly, but they proved to be quite active participants on the level of mobilizing men to this acts. The texts of sentences bear repeated mentioning of provocative and inspiring statements  and  acts  on  the  part  of  local  Kyrghyz   females: "Defendant  Kyiazov provided evidence that when he and Kalmatov ran into the refugees,  Kyrghys women were saying reproachfully ‑  "why are  you here,  Uzbek kill Kyrghyz in Osh,  they throw them off the balconies,  impale  them   on   stakes".   Defendants   found   the weapons..."(Supreme Court Sentence of August 26,  1991,  p.8). Poll conducted among experts in Osh oblast  by  A.B.Elebayeva  in  April 1991  confirms  the  same  observation:  12.3%  pointed  to women's involvements interethnic conflicts (Elebayeva, 1991:74). 

     However the fact than only 53.3%  experts stated that men tend to  be  more active in conflicts can not be viewed as relevant with respect to EV as such. Men undoubtedly dominate, both as organizers and executors. Predominance of young men with active involvement of teenagers is most observable  phenomenon.  As  a  matter  of  fact, analysis of respondents' answers in the afore‑mentioned poll proves to that as well:  79%  pointed young people and 23%  ‑ teenagers as those   playing   most  destructive  role  in  interethnic  clashes (Elebayeva, 1991:74). Defendants fall into the following groups according  to  their age: 29 people were born in 1960's, i.e. they were 25‑30 years old. This is the most representative cohort of  EV  performants.  Eight individuals  were  born  in 1970's and the same number were born in 1950's.  Men older than 40 prove to be a rare exception among those who  actively  participated  in the EV.  There was a separate legal procedure for the case of A.Tashaliev,  born 1940,  ‑ organizer  of pogroms in the outskirts of Uzgen.  O.Sulemanoi, born 1924, was the most elderly participant of the conflict ‑ main  organizer  of  the battery of two Uzbeks in Mirza‑Aki village. 

     Marital status of the participants:  28 were married,  17 were single and information on the other three bear  no  data  regarding their  status.  It is noteworthy that virtually all married men had children,  in  the  overall  they  were  fathers  to  79  children. Tashaliev  who  was  mentioned  above  had ten children,  defendant Kultayev had six children under legal age,  defendant Ubekayev  had five  children under legal age.  Apparently,  fatherhood implying a more high level of social responsibility in one's behavior, did not serve  as a restricting factor in this case.  Possibly,  defendants were  certain  in  their  impunity  with  respect  to  the   crimes committed. Educational level  of  EV  participants  presents  a  striking feature:  40  defendants  finished  high   schools   or  technical colleges, four had secondary education and only Suleymenov who was a retired person had  a  5‑grades  education;  the  only  female  ‑ defendant  Kakieva (there is no data on the other two participants) turned out to be the only one with any education).  In other words, virtually all Kyrghyz ‑ rural dwellers,  that took part in criminal acts were literate people who had finished high school or technical vocational school. Practically all  of  them  had  professions and jobs.  Tractor drivers and track drivers proved to be  the  most  well‑represented occupations  among the defendants ‑ 14 people,  six were shepherds. Only four individuals had no job.  Therefore, an everyday myth that either  certain mafia dealers (only two defendants had jobs related to commerce, and none of them were engaged in business) or declasse lumpens  are  the  participants  of  pogroms  and  unrest  finds no confirmation.  In  this  case  social‑professional  status  of   EV participants looks rather respectable by rural standards:  almost a "rural elite",  not counting total lack of local intelligentsia and managerial  personnel  among the defendants.  Participants perfectly fit in the social category of rural working class and in no way may be  indiscriminately  regarded as "criminal elements".  At the same time five participants had  previous record, but it did not, for instance,  prevent  Tashaliev  from  becoming a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet. 

    But what is important that formal data on social status  should be  corrected  within  the framework of the Soviet distorted social realities.  The  overall   and   compulsory   secondary   education practising  for  a  long time on the territory of the former Soviet Union has become a  hidden  form  for  a  delayed  start  of  labour activities  and thus,  fostered infantilism and low level of social responsibility among the young generation.  Prior to the army draft (i.e.  prior  to  the  18 years of age) it was an accepted order to attend school  and  not  become  employed  before  serving  in  the military. It  was one of the most wide‑spread attitude all over the country.  As for the quality of secondary education it has remained extremely poor, especially in the Central Asian villages. Young males  seemed  to have had mastered professions and only four of those were unskilled workers,  but in practice all of  them were engaged in unqualified and rather hard labour. Most part of the working day (which was not fixed) for tractor drivers and shepherds goes on in monotonous and secluded way (not within a group). One of the defendants denied guilt,  referring to the fact that "on June 5 and on June 6, 1990 from morning until 3 p.m. he was working in the field,  at "Bavyr plot". He worked alone on the tractor, there were no other tractor drivers in the field,  during his working hours he had not seen and had not met with anybody.  After lunch he saw  the Kyrghyz running by the field who cried to him that it was necessary to seek rescue from Uzbeks who had attacked Kyrghyz. However he did not  understand anything and because of that got in his tractor and went home to Mirza‑Aki village.  On Kommunist street,  where he was living,  there  was  a  panic  and  people were running away to the mountains" (Case No.1‑53, p.5). 

     The court did not consider this evidence as true,  whereas for us the norm expressed in the words "alone", "the whole day", "on my tractor" seems authentic.  In terms of  psychology  this  situation increases  individuals'  reaction  towards  extraordinary  external circumstances,  intensifies his strife  for  "escaping"  through  a group  communication.  The  kind  of  work  most of EV participants performed allowed that,  since the activity was not related  to  any kind  of  technological  process  which  makes it more difficult to leave the working place at any given moment. 

     Alcoholic or drug intoxication presents an important  element when   characterizing   the   condition  under  which  EV  evolves. Incidentally this topic is practically not found in  the  sentences texts  as compared to the existing practice in other regions of the former USSR.  But at the  same  time  alcoholic  intoxication  and violence  are  clearly  related  in  the case of mass intercommunal conflicts as well. Overwhelming majority of the defendants had been intoxicated  by  the  moment  of  the  clashes or consumed alcohol having started criminal acts.  Here is the manner in which most  of these facts are ascertained in the documents:  "At this moment they were approached by defendant Zhokobayev,  who felt  hatred  towards Uzbek  after  he  had  consumed  liquor on that day in the centre of Mirza‑Aki.  He intentionally hit M.Ibragimov with a  stick  in  his back  and his arm and then took off alone along Moskovskaya street" (Case No.1‑53, p.3).

     Zhokobayev himself testified that early in the morning on  June 6, 1990 he went to the office of sovkhoz "Alcha" because a car that carries tractor drivers to their work place had not arrived to pick him  up.  He  joined  a  group  of  Kyrghyz  guys who were drinking alcohol near "Galantereya" shop on Sovetskaya street and drank 150 grams  of  vodka  together with them.  Then he found a stick on the road as to fight off Uzbeks should they attack him" (Case No.1‑53, p.7).

     Participants of  EV  did not have rigid internal hierarchy and required leadership determined by any official status.  It was just in one case that we can talking about an obvious organizer.  Due to the fact that this person  was  well  known  and  could  be  easily recognized  as  the  deputy,  he  succeeded in organizing a mob to carry out pogroms in his village of Gulistan, led that group to the outskirts  of Uzgen and where they committed arson,  batteries and one murder.  He  gave  out  commands  that  were  met  by  complete obedience:  "open fire at Sarts", "set on fire", "beat, kill Sarts" etc. (Supreme Court Sentence of March 15, 1991). 

     In committing violence rank‑and‑file participants of  EV  were constantly asking for sanctions as to execute a decisive act. "Then one of pogroms participants who burst into the room and  was  armed with  a gun,  asked Ataman (Tashaliev's name) "should we kill him?" Ataman replied that since he has got children he may live. Then they asked  him  whether  they  could set the house on fire,  but Ataman answered  that  should  his  [victim's]  house  be  set  on   fire, neighbours'  houses  where  Kyrghyz live will start burning.  So he pointed at the houses of Kasimzhan‑Aka and Vakhapzhan Sabirov. Then pogrom  participants  poured gasoline over firewood near the houses and set them on fire" (Ibid, p.6). 

     However, individuals who did not participate violent acts in a direct  way but were vested with power to give out commands because of their status may also be classified as leaders.  There  were  no local bosses among the defendants,  but one of them ‑ Eshiev ‑ gave the following testimony: "Early in the morning the next day (June 6 ‑  V.T.)  [he]  drove  "GAZ‑53"  truck  #48‑00  OShL to Uzgen state collective farm garage where he worked as a driver.  He was  called by  the  chairman  of  Dzhalandin  rural Soviet who said that a red "Niva" car with Uzbeks went in the village Krasny  Mayak  direction and he ordered to drive them back.  About 15‑20 people got into his truck,  among them were all defendants..." (Case No.1‑56,  p.7). It is  quite  clear  that  the  word  "ordered"  more  than adequately reflects the situation.  Local bosses were most likely the indirect participants or the witneeses of EV; they gave out initial blessing instructions and secured the  feeling  of  permissiveness  among  the  activists  and rank‑and‑file  executors.  At any rate our documents do not contain any evidence of peacemaking or responsible activities on  the  part of this category.

Victims of ethnic violence

While the question of against whom is EV aimed at  presents  a special  theme  for a researcher,  there is one commonality of open ethnic conflicts that can be easily determined.  Conflicting  sides tend  to  kill  males  and  rape females:  they do the former as to weaken the adversary and suppress possible actions on his part (men are the executors of these actions);  they perform the latter as to humiliate the  opponent,  demonstrate  their  superiority  and  get satisfaction, both physical and moral. 

     In Osh  conflict  in  the  cases considered Uzbek men from the different territory and as Uzbek women from  Uzgen  were  the  most "preferable" victims.  The search for such "double" aliens went on with special intensity and  most  brutal  forms  of  violence  were applied  to  them.  But  community  members failed to escape ethnic violence as well.  In Mirza‑Aki on June 5  "it  was  already  after lunch  that  Kyrghyz  families  disassociated themselves from Uzbek neighbours and did not permit the latter to seek rescue  in  their houses. Uzbek families that are in minority on this village started to hide within the bounds of their households or in the  houses  of Kyrghyz  neighbours  who had abandoned their places for these days" (Case No. 1‑54, p.2). In fact, in the morning of June 5 a number of Kyrghyz frightened by news from Uzgen and by rumours about possible attacks of Uzbeks started to send their families to the  mountains. This is a very important detail which characterizes the presence of fear among both sides. 

     Children and female teenagers (boys  could  be  battered)  and elderly  Uzbek ("do not touch the elders" ‑ said one of the leaders to his assistants) did not become the victims,  though  the  latter was  not without exceptions.  A number of batteries and even murder of elderly Uzbeks were found in the cases,  especially  should the latter have offered resistance and defended their property. 

     How is  the  identification  carried out at the moment when EV erupts out,  or,  to be more precise,  how are "we" and "they" told apart?   This   issue  of  recognizing  becomes  not  so  acute  in interracial  clashes  or  in  cases  when  ethnic  opponents   have distinctive phenotypic features,  especially the colour of the skin. The language may serve as  a  powerful  marker,  particularly  when there  exist  deep  language  differences  between  the  groups and bilingualism  or  language  assimilation  are   not   present. In Kyrghyz‑Uzbek case the situation is somewhat more complicated.       One of  the  paradoxical moments in the sentences texts is the often repeated phrase "unidentified individuals (or individual)  of Uzbek  (or Kyrghyz) nationality".  While on the one hand this is nothing more than a court stereotype,  it also does reflect  the in‑depth  system  of  distinguishing  characteristics  according to which the participants of EV could precisely identify  "their  own" and  "the  alien".  In  the  first  place these are certain,  quite possible in  many  cases,  distinctive  features  of  the  physical appearance (anthropologically Uzbek and Kyrghys belong to different racial subtypes).  Secondly TJUBETEIKA ‑ a skullcap  ‑  traditional Uzbek  headdress  presents  an  important  distinction in the dress elements. Finally knowledge of each others language, though in many instances local Uzbeks may express themselves in Kyrghyz and it was exactly this circumstance that saved life to one  of  the  victims. But  in  the  majority  of  cases participants of pogroms were well aware of who belongs to which group and what his or  her  place  of residence  as  what concerned their own village.  Many had  close contacts and could even be friends before.  Mixed marriages are not infrequent in Kyrghyz‑Uzbek villages and the offspring finds itself in a dramatic position,  under conditions of the deeply  divided communities. 

     The documents  show  that it was more difficult to identify an alien  female.  In  many  cases  rapists  conducted   a   sort   of interrogation as to learn the ethnic belonging of the chosen victim. "Having arrived defendants Mamatliev,  Usenov, Chintayev, Amirov, Karabayev, Ergeshov, Alimbekov and Shaydullayev (the latter was armed with a knife and an axe) burst into the tea‑place and  stirring  up ethnic  hatred  began  to identify individuals of Uzbek nationality among those who were in the building.  They humiliated victims D.K. Dzhorobayeva,   A.A.Abduraimova,   E.R.Ergeshova  ,  Ergeshov  N.T. (absolute coincidence of Uzbek and Kyrghyz surnames which  excluded one of the  markers  from the situation ‑ V.T.) and S.Mamatukhanov, having insulted  their  national  esteem  and  dignity.  Defendant Shaydullayev threatened Dzhorobayeeva,  Abduraimova,  Ergeshova and Satimova with a knife,  having learned what their nationality  was" (Case No.1‑57, p.2). 

     There is  one  more  interesting  detail  in the way aggrieved A.Abduraimova explains  the  same  episode:  "At  the  same  moment defendant Shaydullayev came up to Dzhorobayeva, put a knife against her throat and started interrogating  her  about  her  nationality, then threatening her with a knife, he asked her, then she said "Don't kill me, I am Kyrghyz", and Shaydullayev replied that "she does not look like one" (Case No.1‑57, p.8). The last phrase (apparently, in many cases the conversation went on  in  Russian,  as  in the  generally accepted language for communication) bears witness to the existence of a certain stereotype among the Kyrghyz ‑ notion  of  a  physical appearance of one's own group members.

     For those  who  have  found  themselves  in  the  epicentre of violence and who do not have the appearance corresponding  to  this stereotype,  the  situation  may have ended up in a tragedy.  "Later Usenov without having said anything started  beating  up  Nomonzhan Ergeshov  who was standing next to him,  Usenov beat him with hands and feet,  chased him all over the tea‑place.  Nomonzhan cried that he was Kyrghyz and not an Uzbek, but Usenov replied that he was not a Kyrghyz at all and continued beating him up" (Ibid, p.10). In the other  case  one  of  the  pogroms participant explained why he had taken a gun and fired:"as to prove that I am a Kyrghyz  for  I  was aware that I do not look like one".

Motives and mechanisms of violence  

When interpreting an ethnic conflict the main attention of the researchers is usually drawn to identifying its causes. Here we are concerned   with  an  issue  if  motives  and  incentives  that  EV participants were being guided by as well as  the  explanations  of behaviour  which  appear  after  the  violence  had been committed. Almost all participants come up with one common version:  they were induced to act by events going on in Uzgen, namely violence against their compatriots on the part of Uzbeks that  had  occur  the  day before on June 4 and 5. This explanation is equally relevant to all the committed acts in EV episodes considered here. 

     As it is noted in the text of sentence of Bishkek  City  Court (the trial was held in the city of Osh) on the case of 7 defendants convicted for raping two Uzbek women: "Having been interrogated for a  number  of  times in the course of preliminary investigation the defendants said 'no' the  investigators  question:"Would  you  have committed rape should the victims be Kyrghyz?" Makombayev explained answering this question:"A fight between Kyrghyz and Uzbeks  is  to blame  for everything.  Should there be no fight,  I would not have been that mad at Uzbeks".  Temirkulov was angry with Uzbeks because his  friend  was  beaten  up in Uzgen.  Mamtumarov thought that his sister may be raped by Uzbeks in Uzgen.  All acts of the defendants against  the  victims  originated from interethnic conflict between Kyrghyz and Uzbeks (Case No.1‑005, p.17). The last court resolution certainly should not be regarded  as the scholarly hypothesis.  Raping of women,  including that by a group,  presents a socio‑cultural phenomenon of a more larger scale and  occurs  well  beyond the limits of EV,  but at the same time it becomes an almost necessary and stable component of EV irrespective of the region or the culture where it takes place. Here two factors seem to be in  force.  First  ‑  removal  of  taboo  on  elaborated societal  norm  which  happens  during  mass  violence and unrest. Secondly,  ‑ as we have  noticed  earlier,  demonstrative  form  of gaining  revenge  and humiliating.  It would have been a mistake to forget that raping of women by  man  (or  men)  originally  implies physiological aspect, the desire to satisfy sexual drive. For young men it is intensely related to curiosity and desire  to  experience acute sensations.  The more so since relations between sexes are of quite traditionalist character in  local  cultural  tradition.  For example,  under  conditions of EV there emerges a desire to destroy the norm in accordance to which females, especially Uzbek women are to  have  their  bodies covered.  In the night of June 6 when Uzbek women who had come to take part in haymaking, were taken by Kyrghyz guys  in  a  tea‑place. They were dressed:  Abduraimova ‑ in a light colour dress, sport jacket and synthetic sport pants, Dzhorobayeva ‑ in a robe, folk pants and a sweater. Undressing and  demonstrating  naked  Uzbek women were initial violent acts in virtually all the  cases:  "Why  do  you  stand  on ceremony  with  her",  ‑  said  Usenov  and "then everybody started tearing off her clothes",  testified Dzhorobayeva (Case No.1‑57, p. ). At  times  intended  demonstration  of naked women occurred after performing sexual acts.  That served as an  act  to  humiliate  and satisfy   curiosity,   not   having  anything  to  do  with  sexual excitement. Having killed Saliev and raped his wife in a tent "late M.K.Bekiev  tore off the rest of her clothes and offered everybody present to take a look at a naked Uzbek woman and  started  showing her genitals" (Supreme Court Sentence of January 11, 1991, p.7). 

     Getting back  to motives and urges of violence with respect to women,  one should note that performing of sexual  acts  were  most closely  related  to sexual drive and physical capabilities of men. Several participants denied their  participation  in  raping  having said  "I  failed,  since the penis had not hardened and he stood up and went to have smoke.  Having spent some time near  a  car  he again experienced a desire to perform sexual act" (Karabayev,  Case No.1‑57,  p.4). One of the defendants "had pain in his scrotum" for he had caught it getting out of the car and this prevented him from having sex. 

     Why and in which way does the breaking  point  happen  in  the mentality  and behavior of the group and its representatives,  when does open violence against ethnic aliens begin?  We would  like  to formulate this matter in a more precise manner:  in which situation and within which socio‑cultural coordinates  of  a  human  behavior does  the  sign  of  ethnic  belonging  become sufficient motive or explanation for committing criminal acts in the  form  of  physical and other types of violence? In other words, we try to consider the individual and personality aspect of social behavior as a  starting point  in analyzing group behavior.  The same as an ethnic conflict in its open form consists of separate episodes of  EV,  the  latter itself  is  nothing  else  but  a  totality  of violent individual actions,  that are committed by a specific individual and that  are subject to analysis and qualification (not just by a court). 

     Let us  see how does the mobilization towards EV take place on the example of Osh conflict?  In modern society mass media  present most  important mean of mobilization.  Television,  radio and press constitute a widely spread component of a cultural  space  for  the participants  of the conflict from both parties.  According to data each family in Osh oblast including villages of Uzgen area  had  TV and  radio sets.  Subscription rate to periodical editions was also quite high.  However one of the most striking  peculiarity  of  the episodes  considered  here  was the total lack of any references of the mass media. They were simply not found in the given context. 

     This may be explained by several reasons. First ‑ participants of  EV  belong  to  the  category  of  citizens  that  do  not read newspapers, do not listen to the radio and do not watch TV. Second, no  information  was coming out via mass media due to censorship or inefficiency of journalists  and  publishers.  Third,  ‑  official, imposed  from  above versions were denied or the participants of EV mistrusted   them.   Participants   were   not    "hearing"    them psychologically. Finally, it is possible to suppose that there were acting  other  means  of  communication  and  mobilization  powerful enough to make mass media influence unreservedly peripheral. 

     We have  drawn  a  generalized  picture  of  what preceded the crimes.  Notably,  these are the court versions and not the ones of the defendants which follow below.

     Village Dzhylsandy, June 6: "Local population  of  the  individuals  of  Kyrghyz nationality in connection with the events in the cities mentioned above and  being stirred  up by the rumours that Uzbeks had massacred all Kyrghyz in the city of Uzgen and are going now  to  kill  them,  got  together beside  the building of Dzhylandy rural Soviet of People's deputes executive committee (the village of Dzilandy) for self‑defense  and for  executing  the instructions of local authorities in case there be attacks in their villages" (Case No.1‑52). 

     Village Mirza‑Aki, June 5: 'In the territories that belong to Uzgen and Sovietsky regions there had spread rumours about attacks  and  atrocities  against  Kyrghyz population  in the cities of Osh and Uzgen on the part of Uzbeks... Starting from morning of June 5 about five thousand  local  Kyrghyz got  together  in  the  centre  of  the  village  and discussed the situation.  Many went to the city of Uzgen,  others started to send their families to mountains as to seek safety" (Case No. 1‑54). 

     Village Boru, June 5: "In the morning of June 5,  1990 defendant Kyjazov having come down the  pasture  in  the  place  Bak‑Archa to his parents house in the village Boru,  50 kilometres off the city of Osh, learned about the events  that  had  taken  place there.  He became aware that Uzbeks drive Kyrghyz out of the city and that bloody clashes had  occurred there...It  was  learned  from  Kyrghyz  refugees from Osh who were riding in the truck and "Moskvich"  car  that  Uzbek  were  killing Kyrghyz,  and  they  were reproached in their turn for not going to Osh as to help their people" (August 26, 1991,p.2). These court statements are added by details which are valuable for  the  analysis  and  are  found  in the versions provided by EV actors themselves, though the latter had been unambiguously subject to  the  justifying  purpose and most often contained false data on their own actions. However the account of the general situation and its  personal  perception by the defendant seem to be of importance to us. In these perceptions that we find the same stable version on Uzbek  murdering  Kyrghyz and it is precisely here that new aspects of psychological character appear that foster understanding of  the motives and the condition which lead to EV. 

     Bakirov testified  that  since morning he had worked all alone on his tractor and "after lunch saw Kyrghyz running along the  road by  the  field  shouting  to  him that he should save himself from Uzbeks who had attacked Kyrghyz". Having got back home to Mirza‑Aki village he saw "panic and the people were fleeing to the mountains" (Case No.1‑53, p.6). 

     Sultanov: "After lunch at about 3 pm there started panic in the street,  people  were saying that in Mirza‑Aki village Uzbek attack Kyrghyz. Being scared of the attack, his mother and brother went to their  relatives  on  Kommunist  street  and he himself went to the nearby mountains..." (Ibidem.).                   Zhokobayev: "In the centre of Mirza‑Aki there were  crowds  of people  of  Kyrghyz nationality,  all of them were excited and said that Uzbeks in Uzgen massacre Kyrghyz and are  now  about  to  kill them" (Ibid, p.7). 

     Defendant Kyjazov:  "When  he heard about the conflict between Kyrghyz and Uzbeks and told Kalmatov and then Matiev,  they decided to  go  to  the  apiary  and disarm Uzbeks as to make shepherds and herdsmen encampments in the natural barrier secure against possible attack by Uzbeks".  As pleaded Kyjazov together with his accomplice the ground to attack the apiary was the information that  they  got from  Kyrghyz  women who fled Osh that "Uzbeks kill Kyrghyz,  throw them off he balconies,  impale them on a stake" (August  26,  1991, pp.5‑8). 

     Bakiev met Nurmatov in the centre of Kirov village and learned from him about mass  unrest  in  the  city  if  Uzgen  "where  his brother's friend was killed" (Court case, January 11, 1991, p.4). 

     Eshiev: "I  have heard from the people that Kyrghyz were being massacred in Uzgen,  their houses were being set  on  fire.  Having returned  home,  he  took  a  gun of 28 calibre,  went of the rural council office, spent some time there with the people who were very much  concerned with the fate of Kyrghyz and went back home.  There was  nobody  there,  everybody  escaped  to  the  mountains" (Case No.1‑56, p.8). 

     Thus, we  have a rather clearly formulated rumour‑myth on mass murders of Kyrghyz by Uzbeks in the cities of Osh and  Uzgen,  that became  widely  spread  via verbal communications.  Though Uzgen is located not far from the zone  of  EV  we  consider,  no  source  of information in this zone had been first‑hand witness to the events. The myth was being created at the site and it was there that it was consumed.  It  appeared  as  the  collective co‑authorship strictly within the framework of one group ‑ Kyrghyz.  The other side of the conflict  must  have  had similar Uzbek versions.  Rumours that had been formulated in the stable version of a myth  the  same  as  the myth  itself  proved  to  be  most  important  factor of intergroup aggression in the course of the ethnic conflict.  As it  is  known, the conflict with another group leads to the growth of unity within this group and rise of conformism.  It is  in  this  atmosphere that  the  phenomenon  of  group thinking emerges which presents an ideal soil for myth‑creating.  As Knud Larsen noted, "group think" puts priority on consensus as the overriding motivation; groups in this cognitive frame fail to evaluate decisions accurately or realistically"(1993:XII).

    The degree of group thinking among EV participants was extremely high.  Expressions  "I  thought",  "I  decided",  and  the like are practically not found in the  documents  whereas  "I  was  told  by them",  "He  told  me",  "They  were saying" prevailed.  Individual critical thinking was forced out by group thinking at the moment of the  conflict;  the  group  thinking  had  a  lowered  threshold in comprehending reality,  affected moral state  and  behavior  of  the participants  in a way which deformed common norms.  From the point of view of one of the researchers of group  thinking  it  leads  to "irrational  and  dehumanizing  actions against individuals that do not belong  to  the  groups  ("aliens",  "opponents")  as  well  as nourishes  over  optimism,  lack of vigilance with respect of one's own behavior, slogan mentality etc." (      ).  

    "Hit, kill Sarts!" or "Death to Uzbeks,  safe to  Kyrghyz!"  ‑ were the only slogans under which EV was committed.  No other calls or demands or even explanations  except  for  explanations  of  the revenge  between  the  participants were formulated.  But even this proved to be sufficient:  initial myth was serving the conflict and violent  group  action  in  a  reliable  way.  More  than that ‑ it defended aggressively from the possibility of being destroyed. When during pogroms in the outskirts of Uzgen A.Iminov, ethnic Uzbek who had personally knew the leader of pogrom  group  A.Tashaliev,  told the  latter that "Uzbeks and Kyrghyz have made peace and after that six people with guns approached him and said that should  this  not be true they would kill him and led him along the streets.  When he was led,  Tashaliev was walking behind him,  and the crowd followed him,  breaking  and  smashing  houses of Uzbeks and setting them on fire" (March 15, 1991, p.8). 

     The myth played a significant role in securing both the  group mobilization and the mechanism of escalating the conflict up to the level of EV itself.  One of the other reasons for that lied in  the fact  that in this case communication between conflicting sides was destroyed,  information  was  becoming  much  less  meaningful  and unreliable.  Simplified,  not disputable mythologema encouraged the replacement of individual  reflections  and  assessments  with  group solidarity,   built   upon   hostility  towards  the  other  group. Irrationality of the ongoing events seems to  be  lending  its  own logic (logistics) to the conflict and fosters its developments in a spiral form.This inertia inherent to a  conflict  rapidly  destroys its  dependence  upon  initial causes.  As a rule EV actors fail to give rational explanations for their actions.  "Why did he  take  a stick , went to the crowd and started beating up Baratbayev, ethnic Uzbek ‑ he  can  not  explain",  ‑  said  defendant  Nazarov (Case No.1‑30, p.8). 

     A myth  and build upon it group solidarity fulfil the mission of both mobilizing to and liberating from internal  explanation  of the  action.  "At  this  moment  unknown guy of Kyrghyz nationality (what an exact identification!  ‑ V.T.) said to him:  "Why are  you standing? Come on, hit" and he, being frightened, kicked Baratbayev who was lying on the ground for two times ‑ explained Ermekbayev to the  court.  ‑ "He beat aggrieved Baratbayev because an unknown guy told him that in Uzgen Uzbeks rape and beat Kyrghyz,  but he  wont' be able to identify this guy, since he does not remember" (Ibidem). 

     Identifying motives  and  mechanisms  of originating EV in the course of Osh conflict may not be satisfactory unless we  refer  to one  of  the  approaches  ‑  theory  of social paranoia as specific medium that is  generated  by  individuals  of  paranoic  mentality (Dobrovich, 1991). Experts believe that social paranoia is based on dogmatic consensus regarding social reality.  In its  extreme  form social  paranoia  implies  a loss of individual identification with oneself and its replacement  of  identification  with  mythological collective individual. While individual paranoia has at its basis a defect perception of the world,  social paranoia is based upon fear (Ibid,p.7).

    Three aspects present main interest in this construct: special psychological state of a group as a result of social  realities  or of indoctrination, role of paranoic individuals in the emergence of EV and the state of fear factor.  We argue that the situation of EV in Osh conflict in the aspect of social psychology and the state of mass consciousness bore quite distinct features of social paranoia, that both the court and the specialists failed to make notice of. 

     First, post‑Soviet   mentality   retains  to  a  large  extent one‑dimensional perception of  the  reality  which  is  as  a  rule are formulated  by  "professional producers of subjective visions of the social world " (Bourdie, 1984:6). Large masses of people had grown accustomed to believe unified  official doctrine and one version formulated in the Centre of the Soviet empire.  At present ideology  of  ethnic  nationalism that had previously served declarations of high‑ranking individuals invaded in a powerful way the ideologic vacuum that had emerged. As a   result   of   past  long‑time  indoctrination  and  present‑day propaganda of titular ethno‑nationalism there exists and absolutely indestructible   belief   among   former  Soviet  citizens  on  the individual and collective level in the  following  postulates  (for example among Kyrghyz): 

     1. There exists ancient and glorious Kyrghyz nation  to  which the indigenous population of Kyrghyzia belongs;

     2. Kyrghyz as representatives of the indigenous nation live on the territory of their national state ;

     3. The republic,  its resources,  state and other institutions are the property of Kyrghyz nation. 

     Each of   these   emotionally   legitimate   mythologemas   and unrealistic  political  declarations  is  being   projected  from collective   to   individual  perceptions.  Discrepancies  to  this exclusively  shared  world  picture   (demographic   or  political preponderance  on the part of the "others",  cultural assimilation, social differences not in favour of one's own group etc) are  claimed to   be  absurd  contradiction  to  the  truth,  a  catastrophe,  a conspiracy of the enemies and so forth.  This reading of  situation on a mass level is characteristic of all former "soviet nations and nationalities"  under  conditions   of  crisis   developments   in post‑Soviet space. One of psychological roots of social paranoia is to be found here.           Group social paranoia is characterized by the feeling of one's own high significance,  suspiciousness,  anxiety,  fear and hatred. Under  minimum  outside  challenges  there  appears  a  feeling  of infringed esteem,  vindictive sentiments and even the readiness for self‑sacrifice  as  to  kill  or  disgrace  the  challenger.  On  a subjective level it is experienced as the struggle of the oppressed with the oppressor.  Similar conditions could be  observed  in  the zones   of  ethnic  conflicts  and  intercommunal  clashes  in  the post‑Soviet space.  The signs of such condition are  found  in  Osh conflict.  State  of  anxiety  and  fear,  at  times even panic was present in almost all episodes of EV. Kyrghyz were afraid of Uzbeks to the same extent as Uzbeks were frightened of Kyrghyz.  Vengeance in an adequate form was the dominating reaction and the motive  for action.  One  of  the  sentences'  text gives the following record: "Unidentified participants of  mass  riots...  shouted  that  Uzbek women  should be led naked along the street,  in the same manner as Uzbek were  treating  Kyrghyz  in  Uzgen.  Then  defendant  Bakirov together  with  Sultanov  and other participants of mass riots tore dresses of Makhturat,  Khabibe and Khafize Yusupov" (Case  No.1‑53, p.5). 

     Paranoic individuals  play  a  special  role  in  the  state of social paranoia,  especially in the rise of totalitarian regimes, despotisms and ,  possibly,  such phenomena as EV. They should not necessarily be the leaders of groups (in the episodes we consider  only  Ataman Tashaliev  may be qualified as such to a full extent).  In communities with powerful elements of social and cultural degradation there may be more than enough pretenders to such clinical or subclinical condition. Wide spread of alcoholism,  poor living and health conditions add to the development of paranoia situations. Therefore, this aspect  should  be  put  on  a  priority  list  in  studying  the phenomenon of EV and may contribute to its explanation. 

      Analyses of ethnic violence invades two different domain of research: the phenomenon of ethnic conflict and the anthropology of violence. For both of these fields this study can be mutually contributing and enriching. In introduction we argued in favour of less monolythic approach usually suggested by political scientists and by sociologists. At least, for a number of cases, like Sumgait events in Azerbaidjan in 1988, pogrom of Meskhetian Turks by Uzbeks in Fergana in 1989 and the Osh conflict, holistic interpretation did not produce persuasive answers. A micro-level, bottom-up observation of violent ethnic manifestations can provide additional eluminations not dening other approaches. At least, it is clear that important psychological determinants, social environment and communal culture which are more related socio-political then interethnic relations precipitate forces of violence and produce fear, aggressive distortions, dehumanisation and paranoia. Sometimes post-Soviet societies may need more routine and intensive social theraphy and psychiatrical councelling on individual levels, effective programmes on the youth's socialization and on the abuse of alchohol to avoid violence then to limit its managing by parameters of denied ethnic groups needs.

     In its turn, the anthropology of violence needs cross-cultural approach even the notion of "violence" we operate is mainly a product of the Western culture and social norms(Riches,1986). Because we do not subscribe the view that violence has a strongly innate component and some kind of genetic basis, it is especially interesting to see how cultural factors produce and shape this act. One of my informant in Kyrghyzia told me a story that during a conflict horse-riding young Kyrghyzes were trying to demonstrate their strengh and superiority by lifting up with a leg and crushing down Uzbeks - exactly in a way how Kyrghyz legend's heroes owerpowered their enemies. "We have read about it a lot, but it is for the first time when it was possible to do by themselves!" Some may call it "non-rational human need" for dignity or for self-esteem. We still keep our reservations on it.

Notes:

    1. We  define  riot‑  or  pogrom‑type  conflict those where no structured conflicting forces  and  organized  long‑span  fighting with explicit front‑lines (Tishkov, 1992c).   

    2. USSR Census of 1979, 1989. 

    3. Personal notes, 12 September 1991.  

    4. The  Soviet court system included a judge and two members of jury called "peoples representative".

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